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COLLABORATION TECHNOLOGIES AND THE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OF UCAVS IN
TACTICAL C2: EFFECTS ON PERFORMANCE AND WORKLOAD
Gregory J. Funke
General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems
Dayton, OH, USA
April M. Bennett, W. Todd Nelson, Scott M. Galster
Air Force Research Laboratory
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, USA
The present study was an initial attempt to characterize team performance, workload, and situational awareness
associated with two types of UCAV control schemes coupled with several collaboration technologies. Six people
participated in a simulated suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) mission, which required cooperation between
all participants in order to meet mission objectives. UCAVs were controlled by UCAV operators and supervised by
air battle managers (ABMs) or controlled directly by ABMs. Participants could communicate verbally, through
instant messages, and on some trials, using a virtual whiteboard. Results of the experiment indicated that team
performance was negatively impacted by direct UCAV control and communication using the virtual whiteboard.
Overall, these results suggest that direct UCAV control may have subtle, yet substantial, negative impact on several
aspects of team performance and that efficient use of collaboration technologies in temporally demanding
environments may require operators to first develop effective communication strategies.
Introduction
The E-3 Sentry, an Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) aircraft, is highly regarded as the
premier air battle management command and control
(C2) platform and provides the U.S. military with the
surveillance, command, control, and communications
needed for effective battle management, and its
capabilities continue to evolve.
Concurrently with the AWACS’s continued
development, considerable military interest has been
expressed in the development of unmanned combat
aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for use in suppression of
enemy air defense (SEAD) missions (Worch et al.,
1996). SEAD missions require air assets to suppress
or destroy enemy air defenses, usually by compelling
anti-aircraft or surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites to
activate their radars, and subsequently firing anti-
radiation missiles at the activated sites (e.g., Li et al.,
2002). Currently, SEAD missions are some of the
most dangerous and demanding that a pilot can
undertake (Nelson & Bolia, 2006), making them ideal
for UCAVs.
UCAV Control
At present, air battle managers (ABMs) aboard
AWACS are responsible for the tactical control of air
interdiction and deep strike, both of which involve
the coordination of fighter cover, strike assets,
airborne refueling, and SEAD (e.g., Kopp, 2002).
Within the framework of current and near-term
concepts of operations, the inclusion of UCAV assets
in SEAD missions will require ABMs to expand their
duties to include management of teams of UCAV
operators. However, this command structure could
place increased workload demands on ABMs as
they must dynamically communicate with and
coordinate SEAD mission assets in order to meet
mission objectives.
Alternatively, some analysts have advocated direct
control of UCAVs by ABMs, thereby expanding the
ABMs’ responsibilities while simultaneously
eliminating the need for additional personnel (e.g.,
Kopp, 2002). It has been suggested that direct ABM
control of UCAVs may yield several tactical benefits
including reduced deployment costs, reduced sensor-
to-shooter time, and more seamless integration of
manned and unmanned SEAD assets (Nelson &
Bolia, 2006).
However,  direct  UCAV  control  by  ABMs  has  been
criticized on several grounds, including the
possibility that direct control may simply change
ABMs’ workload from communication with UCAV
operators to workload associated with monitoring
UCAV operations, a change which may engender
unintended consequences (Parasuraman & Riley,
1997). Specifically, this shift brings into question the
impact of direct control on ABMs’ mental workload,
situational awareness (SA), and decision and mission
effectiveness, and what, if any, countermeasures may
be devised to address these issues (see Nelson &
Bolia., 2006 for a comprehensive review).
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Collaboration Technologies
Recent trends in military acquisition have
emphasized the desire to introduce collaboration
technologies into C2 environments (Kaufman, 2005).
Proponents of network-centric operations have
argued that these technologies might engender
increased SA and task flexibility (Alberts & Hayes,
2003).  These technologies could potentially mitigate
ABMs’ expected workload increases associated with
UCAV operations.
However, research investigating the influence of
collaboration technologies on team performance has
generally indicated they exert a substantial negative
effect on team performance. For example, Bordia
(1997) concluded that teams restricted to
collaboration technologies made poorer decisions,
measured both objectively (e.g., meeting task goals)
and subjectively (e.g., quality of solutions), and took
more time to reach a decision. Moreover,
team members experienced less satisfaction with
team processes.
Conversely, recent research conducted by Funke,
Galster, Nelson, and Dukes (2006) found no adverse
effects of one collaboration technology, instant
messaging (IM), on team performance in a simulated
C2 task. Participants restricted to IM communication
performed at a rate comparable to participants who
were not so restricted.
The current study represents an initial, exploratory
attempt to characterize team performance, workload,
and  SA  associated  with  several  UCAV  control
schemes and collaboration technologies.
Method
Participants
Six people (5 men, 1 woman) between the ages of 19
and  36  (M  =  23.5,  SE  =  2.59)  served  as  paid
participants in this study.  Participants all had prior
experience with the DDD interface used in this study;
however, none of them had prior experience with the
current scenario.  Participants were required to have
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal
color vision.
Experimental Design
A 2 × 2 within-subjects design was employed, with
two UCAV-control conditions (direct, supervisory)
combined factorially with two levels of collaboration
condition (standard, whiteboard) and six levels of
team position (ABM-sweep, ABM-UCAV, sweep-
operator-1, sweep-operator-2, bomber-operator,
UCAV-operator).
UCAV control and team position were block factors,
and collaboration condition was randomized within
each block. Participants completed two trials in each
condition, for a total of 48 trials.
Measures of individual and team performance
included the number of enemy targets destroyed, the
number of team assets killed, and frequency and type
of team communication.  Subjective measures
included the NASA Task Load Index (TLX; Hart &
Staveland, 1988) and the 3-D Situational Awareness
Rating Technique (SART; Taylor, 1990).
Apparatus
The simulated environment utilized was Aptima,
Inc.’s Distributed Dynamic Decision-making (DDD)
simulation, a team-in-the-loop simulated environment
which has previously been employed in a variety of
military and civilian research projects.  The
simulation required 16 networked PCs
communicating under TCP/IP protocol.  Each
workstation was equipped with a keyboard, mouse,
and two monitors. The DDD display was projected
on a 17-inch ViewSonic VP720b LCD monitor and
the Windows operating environment was projected
on an 18-inch NEC MultiSync 1800 LCD monitor. A
Synergy KM switch, model 1.3.1, allowed
participants to interact with desktop objects on each
monitor with a single mouse. Verbal communication,
participant behavior, and screen captures were
recorded using Nuance SDK (version 8.5) and
MORAE (version 1.1.1) software.
The whiteboard collaboration condition utilized the
Dynamic Real-time Animated Whiteboard (DRAW)
application. The DRAW tool is an experimental,
virtual whiteboard which enables users to annotate
and send images of a battle-space to each other.
Simulation
The  DDD  was  used  to  create  a  simulated  SEAD
mission scenario, in which participants were tasked
with following a specified flight path, conveyed
through a tactical display, in order to meet SEAD
mission goals. The objective of each mission trial
was  to  destroy  as  many  enemy  targets  as  possible
while simultaneously protecting team assets.
The ABMs coordinated the actions of other team
members in order to meet objectives. ABM-sweep
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directed the movement and target acquisition of both
sweep-operators. The responsibilities of ABM-UCAV
were contingent upon the UCAV-control condition of
each trial. In the supervisory UCAV-control condition,
ABM-UCAV directed the bomber- and the UCAV-
operator. In the direct UCAV-control condition, the
role  of  UCAV-operator  was  subsumed  by  ABM-
UCAV, who then manually controlled UCAV assets in
addition to directing the bomber-operator.
At  the  start  of  each  mission  trial,  each  operator
controlled four assets of the same type.  Each asset had
a limited amount of ammunition and fuel. As these
resources were depleted, assets would have to return to
a ‘home-base’ to be restocked and refueled. Assets that
ran out of ammunition were unable to attack, and
assets that ran out of fuel ‘died’ and were removed
from the simulation. Initial fuel levels of each asset
were randomized between three to nine minutes of fuel
to ensure each asset would require refueling.  After
refueling, fighter and bomber assets were equipped
with seven minutes of fuel, and UCAV assets were
equipped with nine minutes of fuel.
Additional assets of each type were available to
operators from home-base to replace units that were
killed or that needed restocking or refueling.
Participants were instructed to maintain four assets of
the appropriate type in the simulation at all times, and
to launch additional assets from home-base to replace
assets as needed. However, operators had to receive
orders from their respective ABM to launch from or
return assets to home-base.
To  further  simulate  the  role  of  ABMs  in  a  combat
situation, the tactical displays of UCAV-, bomber-,
and sweep-operators conveyed limited information
concerning enemy units within the simulated battle-
space. The ABMs’ displays, on the other hand, were
not limited in this fashion, giving them a more
complete understanding of the battle-space.
The capabilities and assets of each operator were
specialized for their role within the SEAD mission.
Specifically, the UCAV-operator was responsible for
eliminating enemy surface-to-air-missile (SAM)
sites. The bomber-operator was responsible for
destroying strategic enemy ground targets. The two
sweep-operators were collectively responsible for
protecting assets from enemy fighter aircraft.  Each
unique role was designed such that each position’s
contributions could not be replicated by those of
another position (e.g., a UCAV could destroy a SAM
site, but a bomber could not). This division of
simulated capabilities resulted in a situation in which
success or failure of each mission trial was dependent
upon the contributions of all team members.
Each ten-minute mission trial featured 36 SAM sites
and 24 bridges randomly distributed around the flight
path. Thirty-six enemy MiGs were programmed to
enter the scenario at random intervals during each
mission trial. SAM sites and bridges were stationary,
while MiGs were mobile. Both SAMs and MiGs
could ‘kill’ team assets, while bridges were passive
entities which did not threaten team assets.
Procedure
Training. Participants received 42 hours of
instruction and practice with the SEAD mission task,
distributed across ten days. Participants first
completed a computer-based training module, which
instructed them on the nature and responsibilities of
the task as well as familiarized them with the controls
of the DDD interface. Participants then received
more role specific instruction for each team position,
and direct training with the DDD interface.
Participants also received instruction on the use of
the radio communication equipment, instant
messaging, and virtual whiteboard employed in the
experiment. To discourage verbal communication
through other means, a recording of pink noise was
played in the lab during each mission trial.
Participants also received training on completion of
the NASA-TLX and 3-D SART.
Participants practiced until they could demonstrate
proficiency at all positions. Although each position
differed slightly, in general, this entailed achieving
75% of mission goals in a single trial. Immediately
following practice trials, participants were debriefed
about their performance and about aspects of their
performance that needed to be addressed in order to
demonstrate proficiency.
Experimental data collection. The experimental data
collection phase of the experiment began
immediately following completion of training. Data
collection required 15 hours, distributed over 3 days.
Each participant was randomly assigned to an order
of team positions. Participants then completed eight
trials in that team configuration, before rotating to
their next team position. This process was duplicated
six times, until each participant had completed eight
trials in each team position.  During each eight-trial
block, participants completed four trials in each
collaboration condition.
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After completing all experimental trials, participants
completed a debriefing questionnaire. This measure
was designed to elicit participants’ impressions of the
SEAD mission, the DDD software, and the
collaboration tools employed in the experiment.
Results
To examine potential differences in team response to
the experimentally manipulated factors, an ABM-
team factor with two levels (sweep-team, UCAV-
team) was conceived. Sweep-team consisted of
ABM-sweep and the two sweep operators. UCAV-
team consisted of ABM-UCAV and the bomber- and
UCAV-operators.
Team Performance
Enemy targets destroyed. To determine the effects of
the experimental manipulations on the number of
enemy targets destroyed, the percentage of ABM-
team targets destroyed in each trial was computed.
The data for this factor were tested for statistical
significance by means of a 2 (control condition) × 2
(collaboration technology) × 2 (ABM-team) repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). A
statistically significant main effect of ABM-team was
detected, F (1,5) = 22.19, p<.05. The mean
percentage of ABM-team targets destroyed was
significantly higher for the ABM-sweep team (M =
99.36, SE = .23) compared to the ABM-UCAV team
(M = 82.78, SE = 3.58).
Assets killed. The effects of the experimentally
manipulated factors on the numbers of each type of
team asset killed (fighters, bombers, UCAVs) were
tested by separate 2 (control condition) × 2
(collaboration technology) repeated measures
ANOVAs. For the number of fighter assets killed, all
sources of variance in the analysis were not
significant (p > .05). However, a trend within the data
suggested that more fighter assets were killed in the
direct control condition (M = 2.71, SE = .20)
compared to supervisory control condition (M = 1.92,
SE = .27) (p < .10).
For the number of bomber assets killed, a statistically
significant main effect of collaboration condition was
detected, F (1, 5) = 12.00, p < .05. Fewer bomber
assets were killed in the standard collaboration
condition (M =  .71, SE = .14) compared to DRAW
condition (M = 1.21, SE = .17).
For the number of UCAV assets killed, a statistically
significant UCAV-control × collaboration condition
interaction was detected, F (1, 5) = 7.49, p < .05. As
is illustrated in Figure 1, the greatest number of
UCAV losses occurred in the direct UCAV-control
DRAW collaboration condition.
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Figure 1. Mean number of UCAV assets killed as a
function of UCAV-control and collaboration
conditions. Error bars are standard errors.
To further explore the UCAV-control × collaboration
interaction, separate repeated measures ANOVAs
were calculated in which collaboration condition was
analyzed for each UCAV-control condition. For
direct control, a statistically significant main effect of
collaboration condition was detected (F [1, 5] =
14.31, p < .05), but no such difference was detected
for the supervisory control condition (p > .05). Fewer
UCAV assets were killed under direct UCAV control
in the standard collaboration condition (M = .33, SE =
.17) compared to the DRAW condition (M = 1.75, SE
= .44).
Base launches. Both ABM-teams were responsible
for launching new assets from home-base to replace
assets that were killed or refueling. Therefore, the
optimal number of base launches in any trial was
equal to the number of assets returned to home base
plus the number of assets killed. However,
participants did not always perfectly adhere to these
instructions. An index of launch inefficiency (LI) can
be calculated as LI = observed launches – optimal
launches. This index was calculated for each
condition across trials and compared by means of a 2
(control condition) × 2 (collaboration technology) × 2
(ABM-team) repeated measures ANOVA. For launch
inefficiency, a statistically significant main effect of
ABM-team (F [1, 5] = 44.93, p <  .05)  and  a
statistically significant UCAV-control × ABM-team
interaction (F [1, 5] = 7.79, p < .05) were detected.
As is illustrated in Figure 2, the sweep-team
maintained fewer assets in the simulation than the
UCAV-team.
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To further explore the UCAV-control × ABM-team
interaction, separate repeated measures ANOVAs
were calculated in which UCAV-control condition
was analyzed for each ABM-team. For the sweep-
team, a statistically significant main effect of UCAV-
control condition was detected (F [1, 5] = 13.89, p <
.05), but no such difference was detected for the
UCAV-team (p > .05). The sweep-team maintained a
greater number of assets in the simulation in the
direct control condition (M = -2.17, SE = .51)
compared to the supervisory control condition (M = -
2.79, SE = .48).
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Figure 2. Mean launch inefficiency (absolute values)
as a function of UCAV-control and ABM-team
conditions. Error bars are standard errors.
Subjective Workload and Situational Awareness
Workload. A 2 (control condition) × 2 (collaboration
technology) × 6 (TLX subscale) repeated measures
ANOVA indicated a statistically significant main
effect of TLX subscale, F (1.29, 6.45) = 14.60, p < .05.
In this analysis, Box’s epsilon was employed to correct
for violations of the sphericity assumption (Maxwell &
Delaney, 2004). A subsequent post hoc Tukey’s HSD
of TLX subscale revealed no significant differences
between subscales (all p > .05). Participants’ ratings of
workload were not influenced by the experimentally
manipulated factors.
Situational awareness. A 2 (control condition) × 2
(collaboration technology) repeated measures
ANOVA detected no significant sources of variance
in the analysis (all p > .05). The experimentally
manipulated factors did not influence participants’
ratings of situational awareness.
Team Communication
To determine the effects of the experimental
manipulations on team communications, the mean
number of verbal, IM, and whiteboard messages sent
was calculated for each condition across trials.
However, examination of the mean number of IMs
sent indicated that participants did not use this tool
for collaboration, preventing further analysis of its
impact on team performance.
Verbal communication.  A  2  (control  condition)  ×  2
(collaboration technology) × 2 (ABM-team) repeated
measures ANOVA revealed statistically significant
main effects of UCAV-control condition (F [1,  5]  =
20.33, p < .05), ABM-team (F [1, 5] = 11.31, p <
.05), and a statistically significant UCAV-control ×
ABM-team interaction (F [1, 5] = 35.10, p < .05). As
illustrated in Figure 3, participants sent more verbal
communications in the direct UCAV-control
condition compared to the supervisory condition, and
the sweep-team sent more verbal messages than the
UCAV-team across conditions.
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Figure 3. Mean number of verbal messages sent as a
function of UCAV-control and ABM-team
conditions. Error bars are standard errors.
To further explore the UCAV-control × ABM-team
interaction, separate repeated measures ANOVAs
were calculated in which UCAV-control condition
was  analyzed  for  each  ABM-team.  For  the  UCAV-
team, a statistically significant main effect of UCAV-
control condition was detected (F [1, 5] = 27.94, p <
.05), but no such difference was detected for the
sweep-team (p >  .05).  The  UCAV-team  sent
approximately a fourth fewer verbal messages in the
direct control condition (M = 23.13, SE = 3.48)
compared to the supervisory control condition (M =
88.71, SE = 11.65).
Whiteboard communication. A 2 (control condition)
× 2 (ABM-team) repeated measures ANOVA
detected a statistically significant UCAV-control ×
ABM-team interaction, F (1, 5) = 8.11, p < .05.
220
To further explore the UCAV-control × ABM-team
interaction, separate repeated measures ANOVAs
were calculated in which UCAV-control condition
was  analyzed  for  each  ABM-team.  For  the  UCAV-
team, a statistically significant main effect of UCAV-
control condition was detected (F [1, 5] = 7.98, p <
.05), but no such difference was detected for the
sweep-team (p >  .05).  The  UCAV-team  sent
approximately a third fewer whiteboard images in the
direct control condition (M = 5.83, SE = 1.25)
compared to the supervisory control condition (M =
17.33, SE = 5.04).
Collaboration preference.  Items  on  the  post-
experimental debriefing questionnaire asked
participants to separately estimate the usefulness of
and satisfaction from communicating using the 3
different tools available in the experiment (verbal,
IM, DRAW). Participants were asked to rate the three
tools  on  a  scale  of  0  to  100,  where  0  was  low
usefulness or satisfaction, and 100 was high
usefulness or satisfaction. Participants were also
asked to justify the ratings they gave each tool. Mean
participant ratings for each tool are presented in
Table 1.
Table 1. Mean participant ratings of the usefulness
and satisfaction of each collaboration tool. Values in
parentheses are standard errors.
Tool Usefulness Satisfaction
Verbal 98.33(1.67)
95.83
(4.17)
IM   3.33(1.67)
  2.50
(1.71)
DRAW 76.67(6.41)
80.00
(7.30)
As indicated in Table 1, participants rated verbal
communication to be the most useful and most
satisfying tool for collaboration, with the DRAW tool
as a close second, and ratings of IM as near zero. For
verbal communication, the most common
explanations for the above ratings were that verbal
was the easiest (4 participants) and fastest (3
participants) collaboration method available. The
most typical responses to the DRAW tool were that it
was useful for communicating the spatial locations of
enemy targets (6 participants) but that it was
generally too slow for most communication (2
participants). Overwhelmingly, participants argued
that IM was impractically slow for collaboration,
given  the  high  temporal  pressures  of  the  SEAD
mission simulation (6 participants).
Discussion
The current study was an initial, exploratory attempt
to characterize team performance, workload, and
situational awareness associated with direct and
supervisory control of UCAVs by ABMs coupled
with several collaboration technologies in a SEAD
mission setting.
UCAV Control
Team performance. The effects of UCAV-control
condition on team performance were complex, and
interestingly, not limited to the ABM-UCAV/operator
team. Superficially, these effects appear disparate and
inconsistent across indices of team performance. When
viewed holistically, however, they may indicate a shift
by the ABM-UCAV in the direct UCAV-control
condition to an acceptance of riskier decisions in
pursuit of task goals.
This viewpoint may be supported by the increase in
fighter asset losses and the decrease in launch
inefficiency by the sweep-team under direct control
conditions. Within the simulation, the responsibilities
of the sweep-team were to protect UCAV-team assets
from  enemy  MiGs.  If  the  ABM-UCAV  adopted  a
riskier decision making strategy under direct control
conditions, this may have led to the acceptance of
more MiG-vulnerable UCAV-team asset
deployments. This posture would then necessitate
fighter asset engagements under less ideal
circumstances as the sweep-team attempted to meet
their task objectives, resulting in increased fighter
asset losses and more efficient sweep-team launch
strategies to replace those killed assets. Further
compounding the issue, the shift to a riskier decision-
making strategy is not supported by a concomitant
increase in the number of enemy targets destroyed for
either ABM. Overall, direct control of UCAV assets
by the ABM-UCAV resulted in subtle, yet
substantial, negative impact on team performance.
Workload and situational awareness. Participants’
ratings of workload and situational awareness were
unchanged by UCAV-control condition. The lack of
significant workload change under direct UCAV control
is of note. Three potential explanations may account for
this. First, it may be that increased workload associated
with direct UCAV control may be equally offset by the
reduction of workload related to operator supervision
(i.e., both UCAV-control conditions resulted in equal).
This explanation, however, does not adequately explain
the shifts in team performance observed under direct
UCAV control.
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Alternatively, it may be possible that participants in
the role of ABM-UCAV offset additional workload
associated with direct UCAV control by accepting
riskier task strategies, as discussed previously. As
noted by Singleton (1989), if the workload demands
of a task exceed operators’ abilities to manage, a
skilled operator may adjust their performance
strategies to compensate. One such adjustment may
be to expend less effort in meeting task demands,
leading to a decrement in task performance (Wickens
& Hollands, 2000).
Finally, the competition and game-related nature of
the SEAD task may have motivated participation in
ways that diminished the negative effects of direct
UCAV control. It is possible that participants in the
direct control condition expended more effort and yet
reported no changes in workload and situational
awareness because they were sufficiently engaged
with the task. Support for this viewpoint comes from
previous research linking task engagement to
subjective energy and performance on difficult,
attentionally demanding tasks (e.g., Matthews &
Westerman, 1994). In other words, participants may
have been insulated against the negative effects of
direct UCAV control on workload and situational
awareness through motivation and engagement with
the task.
Collaboration Technologies
Team performance. Access to the virtual whiteboard in
the current experiment resulted in poorer team
performance, as indexed by the number of bomber and
UCAV assets killed. This may potentially be attributed
to participants’ need to switch attention between the
DDD and DRAW displays, perhaps frequently, to
utilize the information provided by the whiteboard
image. The additional time required to shift attention
from the DDD display, acquire and process
information from the DRAW image, and then shift
attention back may have been sufficiently distracting
to result in the performance decrements observed.
Participants may also have adopted an inappropriate
display-sampling strategy focused on obtaining
information from whiteboard images, resulting in
insufficient attention to SEAD tasks, and ultimately,
poorer team performance. As noted by Wickens and
Hollands (2000), individuals have a tendency to seek
more information than they can process and integrate
quickly. Under conditions of temporal demand, such
as those of many C2 environments, this may result in
impaired decision making as a consequence of the
information-rich setting (Wright, 1974).
Interestingly, participants’ ratings of the DRAW tool
were seemingly insensitive to this decrement, as it
was  rated  very  highly  in  both  usefulness  and
satisfaction by all participants. This may indicate that
personnel in C2 environments need substantial
training, beyond functional literacy, with whiteboard
software to develop optimal strategies for sampling
and interpreting whiteboard images under temporally
demanding conditions.
Workload and situational awareness.  Access  to  a
virtual whiteboard in this experiment did not affect
participants’ ratings of workload and situational
awareness. It may be that the additional expenditures
of time and effort associated with sending, receiving,
and interpreting whiteboard images offset any
positive impact those images may have had on
workload and situational awareness. This viewpoint
is particularly interesting in light of participants’
comments about the utility of communicating the
spatial locations of enemy targets using whiteboard
images. Participants may have overestimated the
utility of a virtual whiteboard for communicating
spatial information, but misperceive the associated
costs to team performance.
Overall, the results raise concerns over utilizing a
whiteboard for collaboration in time-sensitive
situations, at least as it was utilized in this experiment.
If extensive training with the tool is necessary to
overcome the performance impairments observed, then
a more efficient solution may be to limit its use to
collaborative environments that are not temporally
demanding. Allowing personnel to communicate using
this innovative medium under such conditions may
facilitate group performance and group satisfaction in
distributed teams without the associated performance
deficits observed in this experiment.
Conclusions
As an initial, exploratory attempt to characterize team
performance associated with several UCAV control
schemes and collaboration technologies in a SEAD
mission setting, the current experiment was relatively
successful. The results of the experiment raise
substantive questions about the ability of ABMs to
successfully carry out SEAD mission objectives under
direct UCAV control, and about the effectiveness of
whiteboard communications in C2 environments. Both
direct UCAV control and the collaborative
technologies investigated in this experiment may exert
widespread negative effects on team performance in a
complex and unanticipated manner.
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Overall, the current experiment offers some insight
into the multifaceted human factors concerns that will
impact future SEAD mission operations, while
simultaneously provoking further questions about
such operations. Addressing these issues is necessary
to ensure successful future operations in command
and control environments.
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